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Abstract 
This essay will examine the emergence of transnational governance via supranational economic agreements which pro-
mote global imposition of liberalizing policies in the interests of transnational investors. The stalled multilateral World 
Trade Organization (WTO) process has given way to a plethora of regional and bilateral economic agreements covering a 
range of new issues—investment, intellectual property, services, and regulations—which trench ever more deeply on 
domestic decision-making. Informed by Phillip Cerny’s conception of “competition states”, Colin Crouch’s (2000) lament 
about “post-democracy”, Carroll and Sapinski’s analysis of “global corporate elites”, and David Held’s depiction of “global 
governance complexes”, the essay will examine the role of transnational corporate and institutional elites in advancing 
economic agreements which narrow the scope for democratic governance. These authors depict the combination of 
constraint and empowerment of states induced by these transnational agreements which force most liberal democracies 
to cut or tweak programs and regulations in economic and social fields to protect investor rights, while boosting restraints 
on citizens in areas like intellectual property—what Cerny (1997) calls the “paradox” of the competition state. Given the 
number and complexity of these transnational governance arrangements, this essay will focus on the transnational con-
straints of investor state arbitration and disputes settlement systems. This will be illustrated by examining the growth of 
investor disputes settlement claims in bilateral treaties and major European and North American economic agreements 
and the rise of arbitration cases which impose costs on states for violations of investor rights. The essay considers the 
implications of these new forms of transnational governance for democratic governments’ responsive to popular de-
mands. It concludes by suggesting the need for revisions to theories of the democratic state, which may be morphing 
into pluralistic plutocracy. 
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1. Introduction 
“[B]ilateral and regional trade agreements are now a 
primary means through which greater investor pro-
tections, commodification of social services, guaran-
teed rights of investor access to investment 
opportunities, privatization of public service goods, 
and generally the diminution of sovereign control 
are being realized.” (Gathii, 2011, p. 421) 
The goal of deepening the global economic govern-
ance system, centered on the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), foundered with the resistance of emerging 
states in the global south, as evidenced in the dead-
locked Doha round negotiations, and the stalling of the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). This does 
not mean that transnational economic integration and 
governing mechanisms have reached an impasse. A se-
ries of bilateral and regional economic arrangements, 
driven primarily by European and American leadership, 
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have emerged instead, permitting deepening of integra-
tion and liberalization across a wide range of areas like 
services, regulation, investment and intellectual prop-
erty rights. Tienhaara notes the dominance of legal 
scholars on matters relating to investment treaties and 
disputes resolution. While this is understandable given 
the legal complexities of these arrangements and the ju-
risprudence they reflect, she urges disciplines like polit-
ical science to begin analysis of the implications for state 
sovereignty (Tienhaara, 2011). This analysis attempts to 
situate these developments in the literature on global 
governance and state theory to bring a political science 
perspective to bear.  
This research will analyze the impact of bilateral, re-
gional and transnational investment treaties on state 
power and assess the implications for the future charac-
ter of democracy and transnational governance. Canada 
the United States and the European Union, among other 
countries, are entering an increasing array of such ar-
rangements, including North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), Canada–EU Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA), Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). 
There are also many bilateral trade and investment 
agreements with developing states in Africa, Asia and 
Latin American including emerging powers like India and 
China. This essay will focus on the constraints embodied 
in these bilateral, regional and multilateral investment 
treaties which are creating a global governance complex 
which shifts enforcement of investment disputes to 
transnational institutions.  
The analysis focuses on investor rights provisions, 
which may constrain what governments can do on 
threat of monetary or trade penalty, tilting public policy 
away from regulatory and spending initiatives which 
may be popular with voters but which impinge on inves-
tor freedoms and profits. Investor rights are increasingly 
enforced even against sub-national jurisdictions like 
provinces, states or cantons in other states as interna-
tional law evolves to implement the growing web of bi-
lateral and multi-lateral investor rights measures and 
make arbitrations enforceable through court actions in 
investor friendly countries. This essay will assess 
whether constraints on state power produced by invest-
ment disputes provisions limit democratic responsive-
ness to national majorities at the behest of investors 
and corporations. The focus will be on treaty-generated 
rules favorable to investors, enforced in arbitration and 
dispute settlement forums. 
These bilateral and regional deals constitute an ex-
pression of transnational elite power which can be 
termed “pluralist plutocracy”. While diversified by na-
tionality and economic sector, elite and institutional col-
laborations are bound together by the overarching drive 
for protection and promotion of wealth. Taken together 
these numerous deals both constrain and empower the 
competition state in directions desired by transnational 
wealth. The forces driving the measures can be consid-
ered plutocratic in promoting the interests of wealth; 
but also pluralistic as they represent diverse transna-
tional coalitions with diversifying ethno-national bases, 
including emerging states and sectoral concerns, with 
energy, natural resources, pharmaceuticals, finance be-
ing prominent examples. This is led by the interests 
which have promoted financialization of the global 
economy. Cerny, Menz and Soederberg (2005, pp. 19-
20) note that this is a loose coalition of transnational in-
stitutions, corporations, private lobbies, think tanks and 
“epistemic communities” whose actions have reduced 
the variations possible among “competition state” mod-
els in the contemporary global economy (Cerny et al., 
2005). These powerful allies have a vested interest to 
promote liberalization including enhanced capital flows, 
investor rights, intellectual property protections and de-
regulation with teeth through disputes settlement ar-
rangements. The result could be a weakening of 
democratic accountability, with states bound to trans-
national agreements which constrain their actions, 
while requiring greater restrictions on citizens in the 
paradox that is pluralist plutocracy. 
2. Globalization and the State 
There is a substantial debate over the implications of 
globalization for state sovereignty and democratic gov-
ernance. Authors divide on the amount of sovereignty 
left to states and the degree of constraints faced by the 
“competition state”. Held observes the impact of glob-
alization on democratic states, notably the “unbundling 
of sovereignty” and the “end of exclusive state control 
of territory and population”; he notes the emergence of 
a “global governing complex”, a multiplicity of agents in-
volved in governance in globalized system, featuring a 
“plurality of actors, a variety of political processes, and di-
verse levels of coordination and operation” (Held, 2004, 
p. 5). Some of these are institutionalized in transnational 
agreements “embodying various levels of legalization, 
types of instruments utilized and responsiveness to 
stakeholders”; others are evolving via transnational 
connections between “public agencies like central 
banks”, which develop “links with similar agencies in 
other countries and thus forming transgovernmental 
networks for the management of various global issues” 
(Held, 2010, p. 34). 
Outside these formal institutional frameworks are 
informal cross national interactions. Most notable are 
those among “diverse business actors—i.e. firms, their 
associations and organizations such as international 
chambers of commerce—establishing their own trans-
national regulatory mechanisms to manage issues of 
concern”. But these are countered to a degree by “non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and transnational 
advocacy networks—i.e. leading actors in global civil so-
ciety—playing a role in global governance at various 
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stages of the global public policy-making process” (Held, 
2010, p. 34). A balance of power is not evident, how-
ever, given the greater structural resources of the inter-
connected corporate world which is increasingly able to 
evade national regulations and to act singly and in com-
bination to shape the power of the state and determine 
its limits. The acceleration of economic interconnected-
ness driven by interests of wealth and profit remain par-
amount. Institutional connections and shared interests 
link investors and corporate entities across borders as 
never before.  
Analysts document the growing diversification of 
corporate managerial sectors, still centered around 
American leadership but with growing interlocking con-
nections with European states and core emerging states 
in the South. Their policy advocacy organizations take 
two key forms, “global policy groups and transnational 
business councils” which provide “the transnational cap-
italist class and its organic intellectuals strategic re-
sources in the struggle to protect what was won in the 
last three decades: investor rights, trade freedoms, low 
corporate taxation and other key elements of neoliberal 
globalization” (Carroll & Sapinski, 2010, p. 532). There is 
also considerable evidence of transnational interaction 
among elites from core universities and in key financial 
and business sectors across nations (Hall, 2011). These 
networks have played a major role in expanding beyond 
the free trade ambitions of the GATT and WTO towards 
broader conceptions of investor freedom and deregula-
tion to open capital across international borders (Carroll 
& Sapinski. 2010, p. 511).  
As new tools for interaction and especially technolo-
gies for transfers of wealth and interests allows such ac-
tors, a transnational pluralistic plutocracy, to avoid state 
regulations or alter them to suit their preferences, these 
actors are in a strong position to press states to adopt 
permanent limitations on sovereignty or reorientation 
in state policies on investment, intellectual property, 
regulation etc. to promote their unfettered interests in 
global liberalization and capital mobility. These are the 
organizations driving integration and liberalization in a 
multi-faceted fashion across trade, intellectual prop-
erty, regulation and investment. In the investment field, 
these groups reveal themselves at consultations in the 
US, Canada and the EU on investor-state provisions 
which attracted numerous corporate, business associa-
tion and think tank commentaries, balanced by civil so-
ciety and union input. They are also evident in core 
instructions like Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and World Bank 
which extensively study investment arbitration and pub-
lish research underlying the system’s evolution. Less visi-
bly these can be seen in the legal arbitration sector whose 
members may act as prominent promoters of the system 
(Olivet & Eberhardt, 2012).  
3. Emergence of Investor–State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS)  
One of the signature accomplishments of this transna-
tional network has been the creation of a transnational 
regime for investment, which since the late 1960s has 
been reinforced by investor-state disputes resolution in-
stitutions. After World War II, the negotiation of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
meant to be accompanied by a parallel investment 
agreement, but this was blocked in the US Congress as 
too ambitious and restrictive (Åslund, 2013). The emer-
gence of the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) regime 
was initially slow, with the first concluded between Ger-
many in Pakistan in 1959. Some 70 more were inked in 
the 1960s and 93 in the 1970s. Investment exporters like 
the US and European states negotiated investment ar-
rangements with developing countries, to counter Cold 
War threats of expropriation and nationalization by So-
viet-linked regimes. These agreements extended na-
tional and most favoured nation treatment to investors, 
giving them freer access to investment opportunities. 
They also limited expropriations to those essential for 
public well-being, required fair and prompt compensa-
tion, and protected investors against exchange controls 
and limits on repatriation of profits. These agreements 
also innovated in including a “dispute resolution provi-
sion consenting to the jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice over disputes involving the interpreta-
tion or application of the agreement”, although inves-
tors had first to work through domestic legal remedies 
before availing themselves of this process (Vandevelde, 
2005, p. 165). 
Vandevelde notes that investment treaties were un-
balanced measures, usually between developed and de-
veloping states; the latter, capital importing states 
assumed most of the obligations to ensure protection 
for investors. These included bans on capital controls, 
local hiring or purchasing preferences and other perfor-
mance requirements. They also provided for compensa-
tion for direct seizures or indirect expropriation if 
regulations diminished or removed the value of invest-
ments. These investor state agreements (ISAs) replaced 
a previous ad hoc system whereby investors had to get 
their home governments to seek remedies from a for-
eign country where they had holdings, through diplo-
matic or occasionally military means. In this “colonial” 
approach (Vandevelde, 2005), countries like the US 
might resort to gunboat diplomacy (as happened fre-
quently in Latin American and Caribbean states) when 
host countries refused to compensate investors for ex-
propriation or losses induced by government action, or 
afford them legal protections and due process.  
The inclusion of binding arbitration implemented af-
ter 1965 by the World Bank’s International Center for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) estab-
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lished the framework for private party initiated arbitra-
tions which remains in place today. The system of inves-
tor state provisions enabled investors to make claims 
against signatory states regularizing the system and ren-
dering it independent of diplomatic relations between 
countries. This created a set of rights for investors who 
could work through arbitration under international law 
to secure compensation, without requiring diplomatic 
or military interventions by their host countries 
(Vandevelde, 2005, p. 175).  
The most ambitious plan for global governance in 
this sector was the proposed Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) which was a proposed international 
investment agreement as a companion to the GATT–
WTO system. Efforts to add investment protections to 
the WTO system, like previous efforts through GATT, 
foundered on differences between developed states 
keen to secure investor protections and developing 
countries seeking to promote domestic policy goals, so 
negotiations were transferred to the OECD of developed 
states. Its proponents portrayed it as an effort by states 
to limit sovereignty in the interest of enhanced eco-
nomic well-being, arguing that liberalized investment 
would create long-run positive sum growth in the global 
economic space. It would protect investors from arbi-
trary and unreasonable actions by governments and en-
hance the rule of law where required. Critics responded 
that the MAI would empower “foreign investors to chal-
lenge the law-making authority of nation states and sub-
national governments” by creating “an international 
forum with the power to award monetary damages 
against the offending government”. The deal was por-
trayed as a virtual “coup d’etat” which would impose 
“corporate rule” via an “economic constitution” which 
would transfer power to investors at the expense of gov-
ernments (Stumberg, 1998, p. 493). Critics noted the po-
tential constraints of the penalties, “shifting power in 
the legislative process through the economic leverage of 
investor remedies” (Stumberg, 1998, p. 495). Support-
ers countered that arbitration procedures were increas-
ingly common across economic and other policy fields 
and ruled by courts to be constitutionally acceptable. 
The MAI negotiations were permanently paused in late 
1998, reflecting divisions among proponents as well as 
a successful civil society campaign to block this “anti-
democratic” initiative.  
In the wake of the MAI setback, similar measures 
have been included in bilateral economic agreements 
between states, to allow the investors of a capital ex-
porter to protect their investments in a situation of legal 
and political uncertainty. Contemporary investment 
treaties typically include a few core elements including 
standards such as “fair and equitable treatment” along-
side “National treatment or Most-Favoured Nation” (Pe-
terson, 2004, p. 3). They include guarantees against 
expropriation or nationalizations without compensa-
tion, freedom for capital movement, and increasingly a 
form of dispute-settlement process (either state-to-
state or investor-to-state). Most of these agreements 
have been bilateral, but such provisions have also been 
included in multilateral economic agreements, including 
the major regional trade agreements involving Euro-
pean and North American States.  
Vandevelde refers to the 1980–2000 period as a 
“global era” for ISDS after the end of the Cold War, when 
the “end of history” presumption of liberal capitalist uni-
formity meant developing and transitional socialist 
states accepted investment liberalization on American 
and European terms (UNCTAD, 2000). The pace of nego-
tiation and adoption of ISDS provisions increased over 
time, peaking around the turn of the millennium, (Figure 
1) though reducing in frequency more recently.  
 
Figure 1. Number of new BITs per year. Source: UNCTAD (2006) 
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Gordon and Pohl (2015, p. 36) note that as the pace 
of bilateral investment treaties slacked off, replacement 
agreements became more prominent. But the overall 
number of BITs (also accompanied by other forms of in-
vestment agreements including multinational regional 
deals like NAFTA and TPP) brought the total number to 
2500 by 2005 (Figure 2). While the pace has slowed 
somewhat, there are currently around 3300 agreements 
(UNCTAD, 2015). 
Investor state disputes resolution (ISDS) mecha-
nisms create processes whereby states can be directly 
challenged by actual or potential investors over loss of 
real or anticipated profits. In most of these systems, ad 
hoc tribunals drawn from a set of legal professionals de-
termine if a state has breached investment obligations; 
they can decide on damages, and impose costs and pen-
alties with limited possibility for review and limited 
transparency or release of justification for decisions. 
The pacts can be used to impose settlements, which do-
mestic courts may have to enforce; but in the absence 
of compliance by a respondent state, international law 
may be used under the New York or Washington Con-
ventions on arbitration settlements to enforce judge-
ments in an investor-friendly jurisdiction. 
Kaushal argues that “Foreign direct investment 
(‘FDI’) and bilateral investment treaties (‘BITs’) have be-
come key building blocks of the international legal and 
economic architecture….This network of BITs has en-
gendered a regime of investment treaty arbitration 
complete with dedicated international institutions” 
with, “common procedural rules, substantive obliga-
tions, a rotating group of arbitrators, a specialized cadre 
of lawyers, and a growing body of decisions” (Kaushal, 
2009, pp. 491-492). Bilateral and regional investment 
agreements made up for the lack of enforceable inves-
tor rights in the WTO, permitting direct claims against 
states. Investment treaties “increasingly offer foreign in-
vestors an opportunity directly to challenge breaches of 
WTO law and to seek relief in the form of cessation of the 
WTO-inconsistent measure and, when the measure can 
be shown to have proximately caused them injury, dam-
ages” (Verhoosel, 2003).  
4. Investor Disputes Settlement Systems as a 
Contested Global Governance Complex 
Initially only a trickle of investment disputes went to ar-
bitration processes, mostly targeted at developing 
states with uncertain legal protection for investors. Dis-
putes resolution cases have increased dramatically over 
the last 30 years. Investor state disputes mechanisms 
have grown ever prevalent and are becoming a more 
routine means for transnational enforcement of liberal-
ized investment rules. Many of these are conducted un-
der the World Bank’s International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) system which 
uses ad hoc arbitrators chosen by the parties rather than 
permanent professional adjudicators. Other investment 
treaties rely on bilateral or regional arrangements spe-
cific to the BIT in question.  
The United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) sets general rules for disputes 
settlement which may be addressed through the ICSID 
institutions or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 
in The Hague. Other investment treaties may permit 
parties to make claims via commercial arbitration cen-
ters like the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce (SCC), London Court of Interna-
tional Arbitration, or the International Chamber of Com-
merce’s Court of International Arbitration in Paris. But 
as shown in Table 1, a substantial majority of the known 
cases take place under the World Bank ICSID umbrella.  
 
Figure 2. Total number of BITs in force. Source: UNCTAD (2006, 2015). 
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Table 1. Major administering investment arbitration institutions. Source: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/ 
FilterByRulesAndInstitution 
Acronym Institution # of Cases 
CRCICA Cairo Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration 2 
ICC International Chamber of Commerce 4 
ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 451 
LCIA London Court of International Arbitration 5 
MCCI Moscow Chamber of Commerce and Industry 3 
PCA Permanent Court of Arbitration 83 
SCC Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 35 
 
Figure 3. Number of claims by respondent state. Source: UNCTAD (2015). 
 
Figure 4. Number of claims by home state. Source: UNCTAD (2015). 
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states. And authorities in the developed world 
acknowledge that the system works mostly on their be-
half, with few worries about challenges from the devel-
oping world. The USTR notes for instance, “Because of 
the safeguards in US agreements and because of the 
high standards of our legal system, foreign investors 
rarely pursue arbitration against the United States and 
have never been successful when they have done so” 
(USTR, 2015).  
The evolution of jurisprudence on enforcement of 
international arbitration awards under the New York 
and Washington conventions could prevent states from 
ducking their obligations and avoiding claims for com-
pensation. They can also expose sub-national units like 
states or provinces to court sanction and even expropri-
ation of property internationally if they did not enforce 
ISDS or declined to pay penalties appropriately. Evolving 
jurisprudence in the US and other jurisdictions may per-
mit claimants aggrieved at national or sub-national pol-
icies to sue in foreign courts and have assets of those 
states or provinces seized as compensation (Van Harten 
& Loughlin, 2006). 
Supporters of such provisions suggest they protect 
investors and clarify investment rules and ensure that 
investors can obtain redress for laws or regulations 
which erode profit potential. UNCTAD outlines the core 
goals succinctly: “IIAs may offer an avenue for the reso-
lution of investor–State disputes that allow significant 
disagreements to be overcome and the investment re-
lationship to survive. Equally, where the disagreement 
is fundamental and the underlying relationship is at an 
end, the system offered by an IIA might help to ensure 
that an adequate remedy is offered to the aggrieved 
party and that the investment relationship can be un-
wound with a degree of security and equity, so that the 
legitimate expectations of both parties can, to some ex-
tent, be preserved” (UNCTAD, 2003, p. 8). Many busi-
ness sectors and associations (Carroll and Sapinskis’ 
transnational networks of multi-national firms and lob-
bying associations) have come out soundly in favour of 
such measures. Clarity in rules is seen to promote effi-
cient investment flows. Consistency is required through 
the inclusion of these measures in agreements, even 
where states have developed systems of law whereby 
domestic protections and legal recourse exist for inves-
tors who are unduly deprived of profit or assets.  
Given the variation between established and new 
member states, some of which are still fleshing out the 
rule of law, European Union members have been key ex-
ponents of such disputes resolution measures. After the 
Lisbon treaty transferred competence, investment trea-
ties are now dealt with by the European Commission 
(Bungenberg, 2010; Chaise, 2012). This has created 
complications with leading states like Germany and 
France and Commission actors over whether to include 
such measures in agreements with Canada and the US. 
Those two North American nations included ISDS 
measures in Chapter 11 of NAFTA.  
Critics portray the ISDS mechanism as a threat to de-
mocracy and public policy, with a chilling effect on social 
and environmental programs and regulations. It is also 
considered as unnecessary between developed states 
like the EU and the US, in view of the strength of invest-
ment protections in their national legal systems. These 
views are articulated by most trade unions, a large num-
ber of NGOs, consumer organisations and others who 
responded in the EU consultations on ISDS in TTIP and 
the US consultations on the updated model BIT. Many 
of these groups express specific concerns about govern-
ments being sued by corporations for high amounts of 
money which in their view create a “chilling effect” on 
the right to regulate. Documents from trade unions and 
social NGOS express a generic mistrust of the independ-
ence and impartiality of arbitrators and a concern that 
ISDS may allow investors to circumvent domestic courts, 
laws or regulations. A number of trade unions and NGOs 
consider that the changes in the US model BIT and more 
recent EU deals to discourage frivolous cases and in-
crease transparency and accountability are insufficient 
to address their concerns. 
Cases are not inevitably decided in favour of inves-
tor, with states prevailing in many instances, though in-
vestor wins and settlements occur in a majority of cases 
(Figure 5). Costly settlements as well as successful 
claims can, critics fear, become constraints on state de-
cision-making. While not all decisions favour claimants, 
there has been an escalation in both the number and 
size of clams and more cases have included sometimes 
substantial penalties. The true extent of the impact is 
hard to gauge. The EU trade directorate notes that a 
“complete overview is difficult because information on 
the amounts claimed and awarded is not always dis-
closed, even in cases that are public” (EU Commission, 
2015, p. 8) a lack of transparency which is problematic 
for analysts. 
The awards fall short of initial claims overall (Table 
2). Depending on the state involved the amounts still 
can be quite crippling on top of the costs of managing 
the complex system and hiring necessary expertise, 
which can run into multiple millions of dollars; one East-
ern European participant at a recent conference said 
such cases consumed nearly half of his small country’s 
justice ministry budget.  
However, high profile cases (Table 3) have provided 
fuel for opponents. These critics complain of the impo-
sition of restrictions on state decision-making which 
runs against the democratic accountability of govern-
ment. They also note that the closed non-transparent 
system, with arbitrations by for-profit firms which leads 
to frivolous lawsuits to secure payouts for investors and 
their specialized legal teams. Environmental regulations 
are often a key concern, with Canadian provinces like 
Quebec and New Brunswick facing challenges to their lim-
its on fracking and Nova Scotia facing a suit under NAFTA 
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Figure 5. Arbitration results to end 2014. Source: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS 
Table 2. Total claims, awards and settlements in $1 million. Source: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/ 
FilterByAmounts 
Amounts $1m # of times Sought by 
Claimants 
# of Tribunal Awards # of times reached in 
Settlements 
< $1 m 5 10 0 
$1-9.9m 37 33 2 
$10-99.9m 148 42 15 
$100-499.9m 156 19 9 
$500-999.9m 50 3 5 
> $ 1000 m 80 5 2 
Table 3. Contentious ISDS cases. Source: Adapted from Van Harten, Porterfield and Gallagher (2015) 
Legislative Fields Example Cases 
Health Care Eli Lilly vs Canada (drug prices) 
Phillip Morris vs Uruguay (tobacco) 
Environment Chevron vs Ecuador (Amazon protection)  
Vattenfall vs Germany (nuclear energy ban) 
Renco vs Peru (mining permits and wastes) 
Lone Pine Resources vs Canada (fracking ban) 
Windstream Energy vs Canada (green energy) 
Labour Rights Veolia vs Egypt (minimum wage) 
Laval vs Sweden (contract labour standards) 
Piero Foresti vs South Africa (affirmative action) 
Financial Institutions Abalclat vs Argentine Republic (debt relief) 
Saluka vs Czech Republic (too big to fail) 
Utilities Vivendi vs. Argentina (water/wastewater pricing) 
LG&E International. v. Argentina (energy pricing) 
 
for rejecting permission for a quarry. European states 
have also begun to face such challenges, with Sweden 
fighting the Laval case respecting provision of contract 
workers at below national labour standards and Germany 
challenged in the Vattenfall case for its post-Fukushima 
move away from nuclear power. For Europe, being on the 
receiving end of such actions as could happen more fre-
quently with TTIP is novel, since EU member states were 
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the principle architects of and users of ISDS over the years 
in a plethora of bilateral investment deals. 
There is some evidence that “the high costs of ISDS 
or the threat of such costs can have a dissuasive effect 
on states and that investors can use the spectre of high-
cost ISDS litigation to bring a recalcitrant state to the ne-
gotiating table for purposes of achieving a settlement of 
the dispute” though similar disincentives can also force 
investors to abandon or settle a claim (OECD, 2012, p. 
9). According to UNCTAD, with “its expansive, and 
sometimes contradictory, interpretations, the arbitral 
process has created a new learning environment….Is-
sues of transparency, predictability and policy space 
have come to the forefront of the debate as has the ob-
jective of ensuring coherence between IIAs and other 
areas of public policy, including policies addressing 
global challenges, such as the protection of the environ-
ment (climate change) and public health and safety” 
(UNCTAD, 2014, p. 4). 
5. Implications of ISDS Systems for Global Governance 
Investment treaties—coupled with equally powerful 
agreements on trade in goods and services, intellectual 
property, regulatory convergence etc.—have trans-
formed the nature of international governance and its 
impact on the state in a globalized era. “To an unusual 
extent trading states have delegated to impartial third 
parties the authority to review and issue binding rulings 
on alleged treaty violations, at times based on com-
plaints filed by nonstate or supranational actors” (Smith, 
2000, p. 137). Investment disputes provide an important 
instance of this state delegation. McBride remarked on 
how Chapter 11 in NAFTA illustrated this process 
whereby “states have sanctioned a significant transfer 
of authority from public to private control. Essentially, a 
portion of national sovereignty is surrendered, not just 
to international entities, but to private ones” (McBride, 
2006, p. 755).  
Defenders of the system correctly note that under 
democratic constitutional principles, states have rights 
to enter into binding agreements to protect the rights of 
private partners, so nothing about the measures is a de-
parture from constitutional principles (despite critical 
references to the MAI or ISDS system as a “coup 
d’etat”). Nevertheless, it does reflect a fundamental 
choice to empower some rights holders, including for-
eign investors, above others, and thereby to either con-
strain policy or impose costs on states which decide not 
to respect investor rights or to pursue policies (regula-
tions, nationalizations, local preferences) which chal-
lenge, limit or remove those rights. Additionally, while the 
systems cannot force countries to adjust laws, they can 
make jurisdictions wary, change policies by anticipation 
or adjustment if costs are considered too high (develop-
ing countries or have not provinces or states for instance 
may have to think twice about absorbing such costs). And 
the privatized arbitration system, run by international 
lawyers who also work for claimant corporations or inves-
tors in other roles, has also been questioned.  
As Figure 6 indicates, there has been a steady uptake 
in the number of claims by investors and the resolution 
of these claims. To some extent this can be accounted 
for by the increase in FDI and the increase in the number 
of BITs. This represents however, an increased willing-
ness to defer to international institutions and legal 
norms at the expense of local particularism and demo-
cratic input. As such, it is a powerful new form of trans-
national governance regime which increasingly affects 
many nations. As the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
suggests “The increasing number of ISDS cases may be 
described as an increase of trust and reliance on inter-
national law in general, and to international arbitration 
specifically, both by investors and States” (SCC 2015). 
 
Figure 6. Increased ISDS activity. Source: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByYear 
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There has been recognition for several years among 
legal scholars of the profound changes implied by this 
transnational system, which Foster (2015) terms the 
emergence of “internationalized public law”. In particu-
lar, the notion of sovereignty as traditionally associated 
with state authority is being altered. Instead of sover-
eign–sovereign relations, these deals substitute individ-
ual–sovereign relations in ways which empower private 
parties, especially investors. “The BIT…creates a public 
international law instrument that endows the individual 
foreign investor with direct international standing” 
(Kaushal, 2009, pp. 498-499). And the awards, made by 
private sector arbiters (often law firms that do work in 
other circumstances for the plaintiff corporations) are 
transnationally enforceable under UN conventions on 
enforcement of arbitral awards. While in the early years, 
the provisions were used infrequently, the number of 
known disputes cases has accelerated from 19 in 1997, 
to 300 by 2007, and some 514 by the end of 2012. Hence 
what was once a rarity has become much more com-
mon. And the spread of claims across a wide range of 
policy areas (Table 4) has significant implications for 
government regulatory and policy autonomy and ac-
countability to the electorate. 
Bilateral and regional ISDS provisions have broken 
down the boundaries between international and na-
tional and arguably enhanced the rights of private actors 
at the expense of public governance. For critics, the 
transnational plutocracy of investors have obtained 
rights superior to domestic investors and citizens. There 
is increased pluralism among capital exporting states, 
though the dominance of the US, Europe, Japan and 
emergent states remains significant; developing states 
remain mostly takers of such arrangements despite evi-
dence that the flow of investment is not substantially 
augmented by such deals—many states are bargaining 
away sovereignty for very limited returns.  
Supporters deny that ISDS provisions can be used to 
challenge government policies, declaring that “critics 
exaggerate the notion that investors ‘sue to overturn 
regulations’; BITs explicitly limit awards to monetary 
damages” (Miller & Hicks, 2015, p. v). Yet the scale of 
some awards relative to the size of smaller govern-
ments’ budgets makes them punitive to the point that 
regulations could be altered or perhaps not introduced 
in the first place. Some companies have been accused of 
buying firms in jurisdictions in order to use the provi-
sions of investment treaties, and high legal fees encour-
age expensive drawn out deliberations (The Economist, 
2014). Investors certainly understand the potential for 
dissuasion beyond the actual punitive level of awards as 
the threat of arbitration can pressure states to fulfil 
treaty obligations on FDI as states try to avoid even the 
prospect of a claim to preserve their reputation as a safe 
haven for investors (Olivet & Eberhardt, 2012).  
6. Emerging Resistance and Potential Reform 
As Held suggests the global governance complex in this 
field contains non-governmental actors other than cor-
porate or plutocratic ones such as unions, social and hu-
man rights groups which have exerted pressure on 
states to alter or opt out of the investor arbitration sys-
tem. Fabry and Garbasso (2015) note that the increase 
in ISDS measures and claims have generated fears for 
their impact on sovereignty which has led some states 
to withdraw from existing agreements or forgo pro-
posed new pacts. The political and economic costs ap-
pear in some cases to outweigh the perceived benefits 
of participation in ISDS provisions. Several states which 
historically have supported ISDS measures in their deal-
ings with weaker states have emerged as critics. Signifi-
cant emerging states, notably India and South Africa, 
have opted out of ISDS measures in bilateral deals and 
contributed to the defeat of the MAI. Australia’s centre-
left Gillard government also rejected inclusion of addi-
tional ISDS provisions from 2011 (Tienhaara & Ranald, 
2011) though this has since been reversed by the more 
conservative Liberal-National regime which signed the 
TPP.  
Most notably, European actors have suggested that 
inclusion of ISDS in CETA and TTIP might not prove via-
ble. Having pioneered the technique in dealings with de-
veloping states, European countries now are concerned 
about potential losses from American firms use of the 
investor-state disputes process and attendant penalties. 
European discontent has induced a change in the EU ne-
gotiating position on TTIP and a renegotiation of por-
tions of CETA to adjust the ISDS provisions; some of 
these changes appear to move beyond the cosmetic to 
substantive proposals for a more autonomous bilateral 
(and eventually multinational) investment court, freed 
Table 4. Leading claims by economic sector. Source: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByEconomicSector 
Primary resources Secondary manufacturing Tertiary services 
Petroleum and gas (57) Food Products (25) Electric, Gas, AC (139) 
Metal Mining (32) Chemicals (14) Financial /Insurance (64) 
Other mining/quarries (14) Base Metals (12) Construction/engineering (63) 
Crop and Animal (14) Nonmetal minerals (12) Telecommunications/IT (47) 
Forestry/logging (8) Pharmaceuticals (8) Water supply/waste (45) 
Coal mining (6) Beverages (4) Transport/Storage (39) 
Mining Support (4) Tobacco (4) Wholesale/Retail (16) 
Fisheries/aquaculture (4) Textiles (4) Accommodation/Food (9) 
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from the corporate dominance of existing arbitration ar-
rangements. How seriously this is intended and whether 
it becomes a “red line” for ISDS negotiations going for-
ward remains to be seen (Van Harten, 2015). 
Concern is also evident in the United States, despite 
its insistence on its bilateral investment treaty model in 
all negotiations. Alarmed by growing arbitral boldness 
and breadth under measures like NAFTA Chapter 11, the 
USTR tweaked investment treaties to decrease the con-
straint on policy options. They “have stepped into line 
with the developing countries that have sought greater 
tribunal deference to sovereign regulatory decisions” 
(Kaushal, 2009, p. 495). This has affected the US Model 
BIT from 2004 onwards as new deals included guaran-
tees for greater precision on covered investments and 
standards of treatment, more transparency, third party 
intervention and guarantees for financial, labour, envi-
ronment health and safety regulations. But this did not 
remove the private arbitration system, and the Ameri-
cans included similar disputes resolution measures in 
new mega treaties like TPP and TTIP. Critics like Senator 
Elizabeth Warren warn that ISDS provisions in such deals 
could tilt the political and economic playing field even 
further towards large corporate players (Jacobs, 2015). 
Even some prominent promoters of freer trade have 
come to see ISDS as an impediment to some transna-
tional agreements, notably the TTIP with Europe 
(Ikenson, 2014).  
Simple measures like enshrining requirements for 
transparency and third party interventions have been 
suggested to address the biases and secrecy of pro-
cesses like those under NAFTA Chapter 11 (Van Duzer, 
2007). The European Commission introduced such 
changes to its ISDS treaties. These would ensure that 
public interest legislation and regulations should take 
precedence, and “guidance” to the arbitrators to ensure 
that companies are not compensated “just because 
their profits have been reduced through the effects of 
regulations enacted for a public policy objective”. The 
original CETA draft included a clearer definition of “fair 
and equitable treatment” to prevent “manifest arbitrari-
ness, abusive treatment (coercion, duress or harass-
ment), or failure to respect the fundamental principles of 
due process”. It also included measures to dissuade friv-
olous claims, including a stipulation that the losing party 
should bear all litigation costs; measures to promote 
transparency of international tribunals including public 
access to documents; a code of conduct for arbitrators; 
and safeguards to reduce erroneous rulings including op-
portunities for the home country of the states to make 
interventions in the process (EU Commission, 2013).  
Under domestic pressure from critics who worried 
about the ISDS provisions in TTIP, the EU held a consul-
tative process and added amendments, including crea-
tion of a permanent bilateral investment court with 
judges appointed by the two parties with neutral ap-
pointees from a third party (EU Commission, 2015). The 
Canadian Liberal government agreed to CETA amend-
ments along these lines, but the US has balked at any-
thing outside its model BIT and insists on the use of 
private arbitrators as in NAFTA and the recently drafted 
TPP. After an exhaustive review of the US “model bilat-
eral investment treaty” with numerous inputs from crit-
ics and supporters, the 2012 model BIT only contained 
slight revisions of the 2004 version. Most importantly, 
the disputes resolution model was left intact, and this 
has continued through subsequent negotiations includ-
ing the TPP (Di Rosa, 2012). Policy analysts suggest the EU 
proposal is not really a court and does not differ from the 
arbitration model which is the source of the constraint on 
sovereignty and democratic governance (Butler, 2016). 
UNCTAD has lead efforts to revise ISDS provisions to 
address many of the concerns raised by critics, including 
increasing transparency and guaranteeing a legitimate 
right to regulate. Reforms would promote alternative 
disputes resolution, provide legal assistance to develop-
ing states, limit those investors and claims subject to ar-
bitration, introduce appeals procedures and third party 
participation and eventually create a transnational in-
vestment court system to address concerns respecting 
the closed and costly nature of the private arbitration 
system (UNCTAD 2013). Recent agreements have fea-
tured adjustments to assuage concerns about imposi-
tions on sovereignty; these include “a wide range of 
exceptions, interpretations and detailed provisions de-
signed to protect the exercise of authority by contract-
ing governments, with the aim of protecting public 
policies regulating commercial transactions, consumer 
protection, environmental and health standards and the 
protection of human rights” (de Mestral, 2015, p. 2).  
But critics remain unconvinced, suggesting that the 
right of investors to sue states for losses of investment 
values could have a detrimental effect on environment, 
worker rights, and regulatory flexibility. They oppose 
the creation of arbitral councils which would sit in judge-
ment above and apart from governments. Legal analysts 
suggest that the phrasing in the CETA texts for instance, 
which guarantees a right to regulate subject to provi-
sions of the agreement, does not ensure that a disputes 
process won’t be used to overturn regulations enacted 
by a democratically elected government.  
“The legal analysis of this approach is extremely 
clear and simple: it does nothing to establish or en-
hance a right to regulate. Rather, it does the exact 
opposite: it makes it clear that the right to regulate 
is fully subject to the Agreement. All exercises of the 
right to regulate, at both the federal and provincial 
levels, must conform to the agreement. Contrary to 
what is often implied by referring to a ‘right to regu-
late’ provision, this approach in fact prioritizes con-
formity with treaty obligations over the right to 
regulate.” (Bernasconi-Osterwalderm & Mann, 
2014, p. 2) 
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For critics, this makes clear that the treaty obliga-
tions would make a “right to regulate” meaningless. 
Treaty provisions would take precedence over regula-
tory independence at the national as well as subnational 
levels, with ongoing implications for the balance of pow-
ers between levels of government. As to the final pro-
posed compromise, social and union groups 
unequivocally see it as inadequate: “this cosmetic exer-
cise will resolve none of the fundamental concerns 
about granting special privileges for foreign investors, 
undermining national laws and bypassing domestic 
courts” (EPSU, 2015).  
Furthermore, states have not made strong use of 
provisions to influence the system and certainly exit 
from such treaties may be prohibitively costly for most 
states; and treaty provisions in many cases allow for ex-
tended application for a decade or more past termina-
tion (Gordon & Pohl, 2015). Hence the system stays in 
place across changes in governments and as with Aus-
tralia (Thurbon, 2015, p. 466) withdrawal from ISDS pro-
visions isn’t sustained over time. While more claims are 
settled in favour of states, when taken together with 
settlements, investors may well succeed in more in-
stances, though the secrecy respecting awards and set-
tlements makes a clear determination impossible.  
Investors certainly acknowledge that the new trans-
national rules can thwart state efforts to escape penal-
ties. Investors speak positively about using arbitration 
not only to redress losses but to provide another means 
to bolster investment value and offset risks. Legal ob-
servers in the arbitration community certainly regard 
the arbitration regime as effective, especially as the 
Washington and New York Convention arbitration rules 
are now enforced by courts in investment exporting 
states. This system ensures that countries, despite ef-
forts, cannot escape their obligation to pay awarded 
damages (Olivet & Eberhardt, 2012). While supporters 
are correct that ISDS by itself cannot impose policy re-
quirements on states, some concede that there will be 
real constraints on policy choices. “It is true to the ex-
tent that ISDS clauses might indirectly influence govern-
ments when considering law changes that might affect 
foreign investors. Governments will need to consider 
the equitable treatment of investors from countries 
with whom they have ISDS arrangements—essentially 
ISDS points out the potential financial consequences of 
introducing laws that are clearly discriminatory and un-
fair” (Export New Zealand, 2015).  
7. Conclusion: Plutocratic Transnational Governance 
Hence the investor state disputes settlement system has 
become something more than an external constraint on 
the competition state. It has morphed instead into a 
forceful transnational system, a global governance com-
plex implemented at the behest of international inves-
tors who are its primary beneficiaries. While states have 
the prerogative to sign binding international commit-
ments in such areas, addition of investor states arbitra-
tion mechanisms permits private parties to challenge a 
wide range of domestic policy decisions in ways which 
may challenge sovereignty and democratic accountabil-
ity. David Schneiderman (2008) suggests the ISDS regime 
has produced a form of transnational constitutionalism 
which limits states and diminishes the scope for demo-
cratic policy making. It has at least altered the environ-
ment for policy making as states anticipate and adjust to 
avoid costly penalties. Proposals for reform may poten-
tially correct some of the imbalances if they increase 
transparency, limit frivolous claims, and seriously pro-
tect a right to regulate. So far analysts are divided on the 
potential. And the US unwillingness to move signifi-
cantly from its model BIT towards the EU proposal for a 
transnational investment court to replace ad hoc private 
arbitration leaves some doubt. Certainly the provisions 
in the recently concluded TPP seem primarily similar to 
those in the US model BIT, in NAFTA and previous US 
treaties which are restrictive of state policy. 
The system is also only one of a range of transnational 
innovations undertaken over the past 30 plus years, in-
cluding those in intellectual property protection, regula-
tion harmonization, trade in goods and services, etc. 
which have created a multifaceted transnational system, 
a web from which states can scarcely extricate them-
selves. The investment arbitration system reflects the 
emergence of a multifaceted “global governance com-
plex” driven primarily by the interests of a transnational 
pluralistic plutocracy of global firms and lobbyists, 
(countered only partially by transnational civil society 
actors), which renders liberal democratic accountability 
increasingly elusive or even chimerical and augments 
the power of the wealthy in domestic politics. As Ste-
phen Clarkson points out, for small states at least, this 
new global governance paradigm via investment and 
other regimes creates a democratic deficit as govern-
ments lose the ability to respond to citizens’ wishes 
(Clarkson, 2003, pp. 152, 162). Liberal democracies may 
become “pluralistic plutocracies” where electoral com-
petition becomes less meaningful in economic and re-
lated realms—a form of “post-democracy” which helps 
explain the narrowing of meaningful political choice in 
many though not all policy areas.  
This essay has focussed on the ISDS system, which 
may impose new limits on states. Other agreements in 
areas like intellectual property require states to reign in 
citizens also on behalf of the transnational plutocratic 
interests which warrant further analysis in future stud-
ies. This is an example of the “paradox of the competi-
tion state”. Far from eroding states, many measures on 
security, intellectual property and other new economy 
themes force states to coerce their population to con-
form to transnational norms, reduce competition and 
choice for consumers, and restrain individual liberties 
via intrusive, punitive enforcement mechanisms. The 
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implications for theories of the democratic state remain 
to be investigated across the plethora of multinational, 
regional, and bilateral investment, trade and services 
agreements which are transforming global governance.  
Conflict of Interests 
The author declares no conflict of interests. 
References 
Åslund, A. (2013). The world needs a multilateral invest-
ment agreement. Peterson Institute for International 
Economics Policy Brief (PB 13-01). Washington, DC: 
Peterson Institute.  
Bernasconi-Osterwalderm, N., & Mann, H. (2014). A re-
sponse to the European Commission’s December 2013 
document “Investment provisions in the EU–Canada 
Free Trade Agreement (CETA)”. Winnipeg, Canada: 
The International Institute for Sustainable Develop-
ment. Retrieved from http://www.iisd.org/pdf/20 
14/reponse_eu_ceta.pdf 
Bungenberg, M. (2010). Going global? The EU common 
commercial policy after Lisbon. In C. Hermann & J. P. 
Terhechte (Eds.), European yearbook of international 
economic law (pp. 123-151). Berlin: Springer. 
Butler, N. (2016). The EU investment court proposal in 
TTIP: ISDS 2.0. Policy Briefing. Manchester, UK: Uni-
versity of Manchester. Retrieved from http://docu-
ments.manchester.ac.uk/display.aspx?DocID=2867 
Carroll, W. K., & Sapinski, J. P. (2010). The global corpo-
rate elite and the transnational policy-planning net-
work, 1996–2006. A structural analysis. International 
Sociology, 25(4), 501-538. 
Cerny, P. (1997). Paradoxes of the competition state: the 
dynamics of political globalization. Government and 
Opposition, 32(2), 251-274. 
Cerny, P., Menz, G., & Soederberg, S. (2005). Different 
roads to globalization: Neoliberalism, the competition 
state, and politics in a more open world. In P. Cerny, 
G. Menz and S. Soederberg (Eds.), Internalizing Glob-
alization (pp. 1-30). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmil-
lan. 
Chaisse, J. (2012). Promises and pitfalls of the European 
Union policy on foreign investment—How will the 
new EU competence on FDI affect the emerging global 
regime? Journal of International Economic Law, 15(1), 
51-84. 
Clarkson, S. (2003). Locked in? Canada’s external consti-
tution under global trade governance. American Re-
view of Canadian Studies, 33(2), 145-172. 
Crouch, C. (2000). Coping with post-democracy. London: 
Fabian Society. 
de Mestral, A. (2015). Investor state arbitration between 
developed countries. Investor–state Arbitration Series 
1. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance In-
novation.  
Di Rosa, P. (2012). The new 2012 U.S. model BIT: Staying 
the course. Kluwer Arbitration Blog. Retrieved from 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2012/06/01/the-
new-2012-u-s-model-bit-staying-the-course 
European Commission (DG Trade). (2013). Fact sheet: In-
vestment protection and investor-to-state dispute set-
tlement in EU agreements. Retrieved from http:// 
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/ 
tradoc_151916.pdf 
European Commission (DG Trade). (2015). Commission 
draft text TTIP—Investment transatlantic trade and 
investment partnership trade in services, investment 
and e-commerce chapter II—Investment. Retrieved 
from http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/se 
ptember/tradoc_153807.pdf 
European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) 
(2015). EPSU update on the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA), Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Trade in Services 
Agreement (TiSA). Retrieved from http://www.epsu. 
org/sites/default/files/article/files/Trade_Update_Se 
ptember_2015.pdf 
Export New Zealand. (2015). ISDS and sovereignty. Wel-
lington: Export New Zealand. Retrieved from http:// 
www.businessnz.org.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009 
/109179/ISDS-and-Sovereignty.pdf 
Fabry, E., & Garbasso, G. (2015). “ISDS” in the TTIP: The 
devil is in the details. (Policy Paper No. 122). Paris: 
Jacques Delors Institute. Retrieved from http:// 
www.institutdelors.eu/media/ttipisds-fabrygarbasso 
-nejdi-jan15.pdf?pdf=ok 
Foster, C. (2015). A new stratosphere? Investment treaty 
arbitration as “internationalized” public law. The In-
ternational and Comparative Law Quarterly, 64(2), 
461-485. 
Gathii, J. T. (2011). The neoliberal turn in regional trade 
agreements. Washington Law Review, 86(3), 42-474. 
Gordon, K., & Pohl, J. (2015). Investment treaties over 
time—Treaty practice and interpretation in a chang-
ing world. OECD (Working Papers on International In-
vestment 2014/2). Paris: OECD. Retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-pol-
icy/WP-2015-02.pdf 
Hall, S. (2011). Educational ties, social capital and the 
translocal (re)production of MBA alumni networks. 
Global Networks, 11(1), 118-138. 
Held, D. (2004). Democratic accountability and political 
effectiveness from a cosmopolitan perspective. Gov-
ernment and Opposition, 39(2), 364-391. 
Held, D. (2010). Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and realities. 
Cambridge, UK: Polity. 
Ikenson, D. J. (2014). A compromise to advance the trade 
agenda: Purge negotiations of investor-state dispute 
settlement. Washington: CATO Institute.  
Jacobs, B. L. (2015). A perplexing paradox: “De-statifica-
tion” of “investor-state” dispute settlement? Emory 
International Law Review, 30(1), 17-49. Retrieved 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 62-76 75 
from http://law.emory.edu/eilr/content/volume-30/ 
issue-1/articles/perplexing-paradox-de-statification-
investor-state-dispute.html 
Kaushal, A. (2009). Revisiting history: How the past mat-
ters for the present backlash against the foreign in-
vestment regime. Harvard International Law Journal, 
50(2), 491-534. 
McBride, S. (2006). Reconfiguring sovereignty: NAFTA 
chapter 11 dispute settlement procedures and the is-
sue of public-private authority. Canadian Journal of 
Political Science, 39(4), 755-775. 
Miller, S. & Hicks, G. (2015). Investor–state dispute settle-
ment: A reality check. (Report of the CSIS Scholl Chair 
in International Business Centre for Strategic and In-
ternational Studies). New York: Roman and Littlefield. 
Retrieved from http://csis.org/files/publication/150 
116_Miller_InvestorStateDispute_Web.pdf 
Olivet, C., & Eberhardt, P. (2012). Profiting from injustice: 
How law firms, arbitrators and financiers are fuelling 
an investment arbitration boom. Transnational Insti-
tute. Retrieved from https://www.tni.org/en/brief-
ing/profiting-injustice 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD). (2012). Government perspectives on in-
vestor–state dispute settlement: A progress report. 
Freedom of investment roundtable. Retrieved from 
www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/ISDSpro-
gressreport.pdf 
Peterson L. E. (2004). Bilateral investment treaties and de-
velopment policy-making. Winnipeg, Canada: Interna-
tional Institute for Sustainable Development. 
Retrieved from http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/trade 
_bits.pdf 
Schneiderman, D. (2008). Constitutionalizing economic 
globalization: Investment rules and democracy's 
promise. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Smith, J. M. (2000). The politics of dispute settlement de-
sign: Explaining legalism in regional trade pacts. Inter-
national Organization, 54(1), 137-180. 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). (2015). What 
caused the rise of ISDS claims? ISDS Blog. Retrieved 
from: http://isdsblog.com/2015/01/30/what-caused-
the-rise-of-isds-claims/#sthash.w5LpwGsL.dpuf 
Stumberg, R. (1998). Sovereignty by subtraction: The mul-
tilateral agreement on investment. Cornell Interna-
tional Law Journal, 31(3), 492-598.  
The Economist (2014). The arbitration game. The Econo-
mist Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/ne 
ws/finance-and-economics/21623756-governments-
are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbi-
tration 
Thurbon, E. (2015). 10 years after the Australia–US free 
trade agreement: Where to for Australia’s trade pol-
icy? Australian Journal of International Affairs, 69(5), 
463-467. 
Tienhaara, K. (2011). Regulatory chill and the threat of ar-
bitration: A view from political science. In C. Brown & 
K. Miles (Eds.), Evolution in investment treaty law and 
arbitration. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Tienhaara, K., & Ranald, P. (2011). Australia’s rejection of 
investor-state dispute settlement: Four potential con-
tributing factors. Investment Treaty News. Retrieved 
from http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/australias-
rejection-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-four-
potential-contributing-factors/  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). (2000). Bilateral investment treaties 1959–
1999. Geneva: UNCTAD. Retrieved from http://un 
ctad.org/en/Docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
(2006). The entry into force of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs). Geneva: UNCTAD. Retrieved from 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webiteiia20069_en.pdf 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
(2013). Reform of investor-state dispute settlement: In 
search of a roadmap. Geneva: UNCTAD. Retrieved 
from http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/web-
diaepcb2013d4_en.pdf 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
(2014). Investor–state dispute settlement. Geneva: 
UNCTAD. Retrieved from http://unctad.org/en/Publi-
cationsLibrary/diaeia2013d2_en.pdf 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
(2015). Investment-states disputes settlement: a re-
view of developments in 2014. Geneva: UNCTAD Re-
trieved from http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ 
Upload/Documents/UNCTAD_WEB_DIAE_PCB_2015 
_%202%20IIA%20ISSUES%20NOTES%2013MAY%20. 
pdf 
United States Trade Representative (USTR). (2015). Inves-
tor–state dispute settlement (ISDS). Washington, DC: 
USTR. Retrieved from https://ustr.gov/about-us/pol-
icy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/in-
vestor-state-dispute-settlement-isds 
Van Duzer, J. A. (2007). Enhancing the procedural legiti-
macy of investor-state arbitration through transpar-
ency and amicus curiae participation. McGill Law 
Journal, 52(4), 681-723.  
Van Harten, G. (2015). A parade of reforms: The European 
Commission’s latest proposal for ISDS. Osgoode Legal 
Studies Research Paper (No. 21/2015). Retrieved from 
SSRN http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2603077  
Van Harten, G., & Loughlin, M. (2006). Investment treaty 
arbitration as a species of global administrative law. Eu-
ropean Journal of International Law, 17(1), 121-150. 
Van Harten, G., Porterfield, M., &. Gallagher, K. P. (2015). 
Investment provisions in trade and investment trea-
ties: The need for reform. Global Economic Govern-
ance Initiative Policy Brief. Retrieved from http:// 
www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2014/12/Investor-
State-Disputes-Policy-Brief.pdf 
Vandevelde, K. J. (2005). A brief history of international 
investment agreements. Journal of International Law 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 62-76 76 
and Policy, 12(1), 157-194. 
Verhoosel, G. (2003). The use of investor–state arbitra-
tion under bilateral investment treaties to seek relief 
for breaches of WTO law. Journal of International Eco-
nomic Law, 6(2), 493-506. 
About the Author 
 
Robert Finbow, Professor of Political Science at Dalhousie University, received his doctorate from the 
London School of Economics. A recipient of SSHRC and Fulbright fellowships, he has published on trade, 
labour and environmental policies in NAFTA and the EU, comparative political cultures, social policy in 
North America and regionalism in Atlantic Canada. His recent research has been on European Union 
social and trade policy, and the Canada–European Economic and Trade Agreement, especially the im-
plications for social policy and investment. 
 
